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Political Wine in a Judicial Bottle: Justice Sotomayor’s
Surprising Concurrence in Aurelius
Christina D. Ponsa-Kraus
abstract. For seventy years, Puerto Ricans have been bitterly divided over how to decolonize
the island, a U.S. territory. Many favor Puerto Rico’s admission into statehood. But many others
support a diﬀerent kind of relationship with the United States: they believe that in 1952, Puerto
Rico entered into a “compact” with the United States that transformed it from a territory into a
“commonwealth,” and they insist that “commonwealth” status made Puerto Rico a separate sovereign in permanent union with the United States. Statehood supporters argue that there is no compact, nor should there be: it is neither constitutionally possible, nor desirable as a goal of selfdetermination. Without even acknowledging the existence of this debate, Justice Sotomayor recently declared the existence of the “compact” in a concurrence in a case in which no one raised it.
By doing so, Justice Sotomayor took sides in the divisive political debate over Puerto Rico’s future.
introduction
Justice Sotomayor just took sides in the debate over Puerto Rican decolonization. It happened when no one was looking, on June 1, 2020, in Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC.1 The
plaintiﬀs challenged the mechanism for selecting the members of the Financial
Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (FOMB), an entity created
by Congress to address Puerto Rico’s financial crisis, on the ground that the

1.
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Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020). The case,
which consolidated challenges by Aurelius Investment, LLC and Unión de Trabajadores de la
Industria Eléctrica y Riego (UTIER), was closely watched, but not on the issue Justice Sotomayor addresses in her concurrence.
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mechanism violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.2 The Court
unanimously upheld the appointments, but Justice Sotomayor concurred separately to despair that no one raised a far more fundamental challenge to the statute creating the FOMB. According to her concurrence, Puerto Rico has full local
self-government pursuant to an irrevocable “compact” with the United States,
which Congress may not unilaterally amend or repeal. Despite the compact,
Congress created the FOMB, which wields “wide-ranging, veto-free authority
over Puerto Rico.”3 Since the FOMB is obviously at odds with the compact, the
statute creating the FOMB should be declared “invalid.”4 But she “reluctantly”
concurred, evidently because the parties’ failure to raise this issue forced her to
leave in place a statute that should have been struck down as a violation of the
“compact” between Puerto Rico and the United States.5
Justice Sotomayor’s view on the compact echoes that of the Partido Popular
Democrático, one of the two dominant political parties in Puerto Rico, which supports the island’s decolonization through an improved or “enhanced” version of
its current “commonwealth” status. But the other dominant political party, the
Partido Nuevo Progresista, which supports decolonization through the island’s admission into statehood (and with which I identify), does not share their view.6
Our view is that there is no irrevocable compact guaranteeing Puerto Rico full
local self-government. Instead, Congress has the power to grant Puerto Rico autonomy, as it has done extensively, but it also has the power to take some or all
of that autonomy away, as it has also done. In other words, our view is that
Puerto Rico is now, and for nearly one-and-a-quarter centuries has been, a colony of the United States.
Given the chance to respond to Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, we would
point to the FOMB as the latest addition to a mountain of evidence that the
United States neither believes nor behaves as if it has an irrevocable compact
with Puerto Rico. We would explain why the so-called compact is one in a long

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
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U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President . . . , by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Oﬃcers of the United States . . . .”).
Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1674 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1679 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1683 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Nor does the island’s third political party, the Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño, which has
the support of a small percentage of the population, and which advocates decolonization
through independence. For an overview of the three decolonization alternatives by an outsider
to the debate, see NANCY MORRIS, PUERTO RICO: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND IDENTITY (Praeger
Publishers 1995). For more detail on the level of support for each decolonization option, see
infra note 15.
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list of examples of the federal government’s use of legal ambiguity to govern colonies while denying it has any. And we would argue that when anyone, let alone
a Supreme Court Justice, proclaims the existence of this irrevocable compact,
they do not bolster Puerto Rican sovereignty. Instead, they inadvertently perpetuate Puerto Rico’s status as a colony by enhancing the illusion that it is not. But
there is no sign of our view in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, which fails even
to acknowledge the existence of a contrary understanding of Puerto Rico’s status.
This Essay responds to Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence by making clear
where she stands with respect to the debate over Puerto Rican decolonization,
and explaining why her decision to shore up the “compact theory”7—in a Supreme Court concurrence, and without so much as a nod in the direction of the
opposing point of view—not only diverts the judicial power to a political end,
but also severely exacerbates the considerable legal ambiguity that has defined
and prolonged Puerto Rico’s colonial condition for well over a century. My aim
here is to mitigate the damage done by her concurrence, by exposing, explaining,
and criticizing her decision not only to take sides in a political debate, but worse,
to do so in a Supreme Court opinion, and worse still, to do so by ignoring the
other side at every turn, without letting on that that is what she is doing.
First, I situate Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in the context of the debate
over Puerto Rican decolonization. Second, I examine her arguments one by one,
and show that each has been subject to serious—arguably devastating—objections, none of which she engages. Third, I explain how her concurrence exacerbates the legal ambiguity that has trapped Puerto Rico in a colonial status for
over a century. I conclude by arguing that the notion that Congress has the power
to confer irrevocable autonomy upon a territory other than by admitting it into
statehood or granting it independence is not only wrong as a matter of law, but
also harmful as a matter of policy.
i. aurelius and the debate over puerto rican
decolonization
Legal ambiguity has been the defining feature of Puerto Rico’s constitutional
status since 1898, when the island became an “unincorporated” territory of the

7.

Despite some parallels beyond the scope of this Essay, Puerto Rico’s “compact theory” is not
to be confused with the more familiar “compact theory” associated with secessionist arguments in the Civil War era. See, e.g., Stephen C. Neﬀ, Secession and Breach of Compact: The Law
of Nature Meets the United States Constitution, 45 AKRON L. REV. 405 (2012). Parts I and II infra
discuss Puerto Rico’s compact theory.
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United States.8 According to Downes v. Bidwell, the leading case in a series of
early twentieth-century Supreme Court decisions known as the Insular Cases,
unincorporated territories like Puerto Rico “belong[] to the United States, but
[are] not a part of the United States.”9 In other words, the United States is sovereign over Puerto Rico—that much we know—but Puerto Rico is neither here
nor there; neither this nor that. A concurrence in Downes elaborated with the
observation that the island is “foreign to the United States in a domestic sense.”10
Needless to say, that supremely unhelpful formulation (foreign in a domestic
sense?!) clarified nothing. One of the dissenting Justices in Downes summed it
up in disbelief: “[T]he contention seems to be that, if an organized and settled
province of another sovereignty is acquired by the United States, Congress has
the power to keep it, like a disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous existence, for an indefinite period.”11 Indeed, the contention was exactly
that.
Longing to decolonize, and realizing that in order to achieve consensus on
what they should become, they need to understand who they are, Puerto Ricans
have ceaselessly debated the question of their constitutional status. As of 1950,
that debate has concerned the so-called compact.
A. Legal Ambiguity and the Debate over the Compact
The debate over whether Puerto Rico and the United States have an irrevocable compact has gone on endlessly and failed to yield a definitive result. This
8.

On the central role of legal ambiguity in U.S. imperialism, see SAM ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS:
PUERTO RICO, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND EMPIRE (2019) [hereinafter ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS]; Sam Erman, Essential Legal Ambiguity of Empire, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020)
(reviewing DANIEL IMMERWAHR, HOW TO HIDE AN EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE GREATER
UNITED STATES (2019)) [hereinafter Erman, Essential Legal Ambiguity of Empire] (discussing
Puerto Rico’s “compact” as one example of the legal ambiguity that defines the island’s constitutional status). For a basic introduction to “unincorporated” U.S. territories, see U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/HRD-91-18, APPLICABILITY OF RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 4 (June 1991).
9. 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901); see infra Part III (discussing the Insular Cases and their relationship
to the compact). The Court first used the term “unincorporated” with respect to U.S. territories in Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 525 (1905). Today, the unincorporated U.S.
territories include Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF, supra
note 8, at 43-52.
10. Downes, 182 U.S. at 341 (White, J., concurring). Justice White’s concurrence set forth the doctrine of territorial incorporation and was eventually endorsed by a unanimous Court. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304-14 (1922).
11. Downes, 182 U.S. at 372 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
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is precisely because it concerns yet another instance of the federal government’s
use of deliberately confusing and unclear language to describe Puerto Rico’s relationship to the United States: specifically, the phrase “in the nature of a compact,” which appears in a 1950 federal statute authorizing Puerto Rico to adopt a
Constitution.12 That inscrutable phrase (is it a compact or not?) has caused unending disagreement, since it gives simultaneous support both to those who insist that there is a compact (it says “compact”!) and to those who insist that there
is not (it says “in the nature of”!).13
For seventy years, legal scholars, politicians, and commentators have extensively debated the so-called compact theory.14 As it stands now, the overwhelming majority of Puerto Ricans wish to remain in some form of union with the
United States, but they are split as to what form that union should take. Roughly
half of Puerto Rico’s population favors the option of becoming a state of the Union, while the other half prefers to remain in its current “commonwealth” status,
albeit with “enhancements.” (A 1993 plebiscite shows that only a small percentage supports the island’s independence.)15

12.

Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 600, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 731 (2018));
see infra Section II.A.
13. To be clear, this is just one point of contention in the debate over the compact. See infra Part
II.
14. See generally JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE
WORLD (Yale Univ. Press 1997) (providing a historical survey of U.S.-Puerto Rico relations,
including a discussion of the debate over the compact); MORRIS, supra note 6 (describing the
debate over Puerto Rico’s status; the description is based on numerous focus groups and interviews); JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (U.P.R. Press 1985) (examining the Supreme Court jurisprudence
that gave rise to Puerto Rico’s current colonial status, including a discussion of the debate over
the compact); José A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Out of the Colonial Closet, 33 FOREIGN POL’Y. 66
(1978-1979) (explaining why the compact appealed to many Puerto Ricans, and why it failed
to decolonize Puerto Rico).
15. A 1993 status plebiscite yielded 48.6% for commonwealth, 46.4% for statehood, and 4.5% for
independence. See STAFF OF COMM. ON RES., 106TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE RESULTS OF THE
1998 PUERTO RICO PLEBISCITE 41 (Comm. Print Nov. 19, 1999) (Appendix D) (providing figures for 1967, 1993, and 1998 plebiscites). I rely on the 1993 results because the results of
subsequent plebiscites are more diﬃcult to explain, but once one understands them, they yield
roughly the same result. For example, a protest vote by commonwealth supporters in 1998
yielded a slim victory (50.2%) for “None of the Above,” while statehood received 46.5%; a
broader boycott in 2017 resulted in 97% support for statehood but only 23% voter turnout.
See id. at 41 (1998 results); Christina Duﬀy Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], None of the Above Means
More of the Same: Why Solving Puerto Rico’s Status Problem Matters, in NONE OF THE ABOVE:
PUERTO RICANS IN THE GLOBAL ERA 73-83 (Frances Negrón Muntaner, ed., 2007) (explaining
the 1998 results); José A. Delgado, “Desde Washington,” El Nuevo Día (Sept. 22, 2018) (discussing 2017 results along with results of a 2018 poll by The Washington Post that yielded 48%
for statehood, 26% for “territorial” status (a definition of commonwealth status rejected by
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The compact theory lies at the center of the contest between statehooders
and commonwealthers.16 The reason is that, in order for Puerto Rico to cease
being a colony, the terms of its union with the United States would have to bind
Congress as much as they bind Puerto Rico. Otherwise, Puerto Rico is just a U.S.
territory, with no guarantee of local control—and as everyone in this debate
knows, “U.S. territory” is constitutional law-speak for “U.S. colony.”17 Accordingly, commonwealthers argue that Puerto Rico is no mere territory, but rather
has a mutually binding bilateral compact with the United States, which elevates
its status to something analogous to, but diﬀerent from, that of a state. Statehooders deny that a binding compact between the United States and a U.S. territory is constitutionally possible except of course through the territory’s admission into statehood. And they believe that such a compact is undesirable as a
matter of policy, since it would permanently bind Puerto Rico to a union with
the United States in which Puerto Ricans would continue to be denied equal
voting representation in the federal government.18

the Commonwealth Party), and 10% for independence, with 16% declining to express a preference. See generally, e.g., Christina D. Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], The Case for Puerto Rican Decolonization, 45 ORBIS: A J. OF WORLD AFF. 433, 441-46; Editors, Errata, 45 ORBIS: A J. OF
WORLD AFF. 657 (2001) (explaining the status debate and the “enhancements” sought by supporters of “commonwealth” status, which include congressional recognition of the existence
of the “compact”); Antonio Weiss & Brad Setser, America’s Forgotten Colony: Ending Puerto
Rico’s Perpetual Crisis, FOREIGN AFF. (June 13, 2019), https://www.foreignaﬀairs.com/articles
/puerto-rico/2019-06-11/americas-forgotten-colony [https://perma.cc/TD53-MP47] (situating Puerto Rico’s current crises in the context of the debate over status and arguing that
both the former, shorter-term and the latter, longer-term problems need to be solved).
16. For a concise sampling of the arguments for and against the compact theory by leading exponents of each view, see the chapters by Juan R. Torruella and José Trías Monge in FOREIGN IN
A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina
D. Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus] & Burke Marshall eds., 2001), at 241, 244-46 (Torruella) and 226,
235-38 (Trías Monge) [hereinafter FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE]. For more recent examples,
compare Adam W. McCall, Note, Why Congress Cannot Unilaterally Repeal Puerto Rico’s Constitution, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1367 (2017), which defends the compact theory, with Juan R.
Torruella, Why Puerto Rico Does Not Need Further Experimentation with Its Future: A Reply to
the Notion of “Territorial Federalism,” 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 65 (2018) [hereinafter Torruella, A
Reply to the Notion of “Territorial Federalism”], which criticizes the compact theory.
17. See, e.g., Torruella, A Reply to the Notion of “Territorial Federalism,” supra note 16, at 77-89,
passim; Salvador E. Casellas, Commonwealth Status and the Federal Courts, 80 REVISTA JURDÍCA
DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE P.R. 945, 954 (2011).
18. Some commonwealthers argue that this problem could be mitigated somewhat with a statute
granting Puerto Rico representation in the U.S. House; statehooders respond that not only
would such a grant be subject to repeal, but also, Puerto Ricans would still lack senators and
the presidential vote, so their representation would remain unequal. For a debate over this
proposal, see Christina Duﬀy Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], Two Puerto Rican Senators Stay Home,
116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 408 (2007); and José R. Coleman-Tió, Comment, Six Puerto Rican
Congressmen Go to Washington, 116 YALE L.J. 1389 (2007).
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Meanwhile, the federal government’s contribution to the debate has been to
confuse matters repeatedly while dodging its own responsibility to take
measures to decolonize Puerto Rico—which it could do, for example, by enacting
legislation providing for a process leading to clearly defined, noncolonial status
options, and stating its willingness and intention to implement the results. Instead it substitutes action with hollow proclamations of the right to self-determination. Decrying this dynamic, one of the leading participants in Puerto Rico’s
status debate had this sarcastic remark to oﬀer on the centenary of the island’s
annexation: “‘Let the Puerto Ricans choose,’ it is grandly said. Choose what?”19
Given the stakes of dignity and self-respect that Puerto Ricans rightly invest
in the political status debate, it is no exaggeration to say that the term “compact”
is a fightin’ word in Puerto Rico. The mystery, then, is why Justice Sotomayor
would raise the compact theory when no one else did—and having raised it, why
she would fail even to acknowledge, let alone engage, the extensive judicial,
scholarly, and popular debate over each of compact theory’s very familiar and
widely contested premises. Either she does not know the debate exists, which is
inconceivable, or she does and ignores it, which is unforgivable.
To those of us who have lived this unending debate, laboring to articulate
and defend our views thoroughly and with care, Justice Sotomayor’s Aurelius
concurrence comes as a shock, though one imagines that those who just learned
they have an ally on the Supreme Court bench will be pleased, and it would be
understandable. Those of us who believe that the compact theory is not just
wrong as a matter of law but harmful as a matter of policy, however, just found
ourselves erased from the record this Supreme Court concurrence creates.
B. Aurelius, Justice Sotomayor, and the Compact
The federal statute creating the FOMB, the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Stability Act (PROMESA), provides for the appointment of Board
members without the advice and consent of the Senate.20 Aurelius Investment,
LLC (Aurelius) challenged these appointments on the ground that the members
of the FOMB are “Oﬃcers of the United States” and therefore their appointment
requires Senate confirmation. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, reasoning that the members of the FOMB are not Oﬃcers of the United States, but

19.

TRÍAS MONGE, supra note 14, at 3.
20. Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130
Stat. 549 (2016) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 2101).
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rather territorial oﬃcers, whose appointment need not comply with the requirements of the Appointments Clause.21
The decision was unanimous, with Justice Breyer writing for the Court and
Justices Thomas and Sotomayor writing separate concurrences. Justice Breyer’s
and Justice Thomas’ opinions are straightforward enough: they ask whether the
members of the FOMB are Oﬃcers of the United States or territorial oﬃcers,
agree on the answer, and disagree on how to get there. Justice Sotomayor, however, takes up an entirely diﬀerent issue—one that, by her own account, no one
raised or discussed.22
While Justice Sotomayor agrees that the Board members are territorial oﬃcers, her surprising contribution to the discussion is the argument that Congress
does not have the power to appoint territorial oﬃcers in Puerto Rico at all, because Puerto Rico has a mutually binding bilateral “compact” with the United
States, by virtue of which Congress permanently and irrevocably relinquished
its sovereignty over the island’s internal aﬀairs seventy years ago.23 As a result,
PROMESA itself—a statute that rather aggressively takes charge of the island’s
internal aﬀairs—may be “invalid.”24 Although her argument would seem to lead
inexorably to that conclusion, Justice Sotomayor stops short of reaching it outright, claiming that her hands are tied because the plaintiﬀs did not raise the
issue.25 Instead, because she agrees that the FOMB members are territorial oﬃcers, to whom the requirements of the Appointments Clause do not apply, she
“reluctantly” concurs.26
Justice Sotomayor presents Puerto Rico’s “compact” as if it were a self-evidently legitimate basis for striking down PROMESA, on a par with the Appointments Clause itself. To read her concurrence, you would think the parties, the
amici, and the eight other Justices unaccountably missed the constitutional elephant in the courtroom.

21.

22.

23.
24.
25.
26.
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The First Circuit agreed with the plaintiﬀs but upheld the actions of the Board under the de
facto oﬃcer doctrine. Aurelius Inv., LLC v. Puerto Rico, 915 F.3d 838, 856, 862 (1st Cir. 2019).
Because the Supreme Court disagreed, there was no need to reach the de facto oﬃcer issue.
See Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1654 (2020).
See also Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1665 (“[A]s Justice Sotomayor recognizes . . . we need not, and
therefore do not, decide questions concerning the application of the Federal Relations Act and
Public Law 600. No party has argued that those Acts bear any significant relation to the answer to the Appointments Clause question now before us.”).
Id. at 1671-72 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1679 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1683 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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The Justice explains her decision to discuss the so-called compact on the
ground that this “unexplored” issue “may well call into doubt the Court’s conclusion that the members of the [FOMB] are territorial oﬃcers not subject to the
‘significant structural safeguards’ embodied in the Appointments Clause.”27 But
nothing in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence raises any doubt about that conclusion. On the contrary, she assumes the Board members are territorial oﬃcers and
concurs with the holding that their appointment did not violate the Appointments Clause. What the compact theory calls into question instead is the validity
of PROMESA itself. What she accomplishes with her concurrence, then, is not
to call into doubt the Court’s conclusion, but to give the compact theory a boost:
her concurrence amounts to nothing less than an emphatic, standing invitation
to challenge PROMESA on the ground that it violates the compact.
The question whether any U.S. territory could have, let alone whether Puerto
Rico does have, a mutually binding bilateral “compact” with the United States
could not be more legally controversial or politically divisive in Puerto Rico. Justice Sotomayor wades into this morass with a concurring opinion that declares
the existence of the purported compact as if it were a given. She does this without
even mentioning the existence of the highly contentious debate over that very
question. In doing so, she has bestowed a gift of immeasurable rhetorical value
on the pro-commonwealth party in its bitter and divisive contest with the prostatehood party, and exacerbated the legal ambiguity that has trapped Puerto
Rico in an indefinite colonial status. Does she not know there is a debate over
the compact that defines the island’s major political parties? Or is she attempting
to resolve the debate by pretending that the commonwealthers won? It is impossible to tell from reading her opinion.
Puerto Ricans desperately need a clear path forward. What Justice Sotomayor has given them instead is yet another head-spinningly inconclusive exercise in question-begging by a federal oﬃcial with outsized power over their
fate.
ii. responding to justice sotomayor’s defense of the
“compact theory”
Anyone familiar with Puerto Rico’s contentious debate over the compact theory can see that Justice Sotomayor plants an unmistakably partisan flag from the
very first sentence of her concurrence:

27.

Id. at 1671 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Edmond v. United States,
520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997)).
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Nearly 60 [sic] years ago, the people of Puerto Rico embarked on a project of constitutional self-governance after entering into a compact with
the Federal Government. At the conclusion of that endeavor, the people
of Puerto Rico established, and the United States Congress recognized,
a republican form of government pursuant to a constitution of the Puerto
Rican population’s own adoption. One would think the Puerto Rican
home rule that resulted from that mutual enterprise might aﬀect whether
oﬃcers later installed by the Federal Government are properly considered oﬃcers of Puerto Rico rather than “Oﬃcers of the United States”
subject to the Appointments Clause.28
To the uninitiated, this opening paragraph sounds like a simple statement of
fact followed by a modest suggestion that the fact might have consequences. But
it is nothing of the sort, because it ignores the well-known and deeply held conviction of roughly half of Puerto Rico’s population: that there is no compact between Puerto Rico and the United States. The term “compact” in this context
means something very specific: a binding bilateral agreement, unalterable except
by mutual consent. For Justice Sotomayor to begin by simply declaring its existence is no less striking than were she to begin an opinion in an abortion case by
asserting that the fetus is a person, and that one would think the existence of
that human life might aﬀect whether a woman has the right to terminate her
pregnancy, without oﬀering even a hint of a suggestion that someone out there
might disagree. There is nothing simple or modest about it.
The discussion that follows in the concurrence echoes the commonwealthers’
longstanding defense of the compact theory. Several familiar arguments make
an appearance. First, there is a brief history of U.S.-Puerto Rico relations that
treats the early 1950s as the climactic moment in which the vaunted compact
came into being. Here, the claim is that events occurring in 1950-1952 transformed Puerto Rico from a nonsovereign U.S. territory into a separate sovereign
“commonwealth” in union with the United States.29 Second, there’s a string of
quotations describing Puerto Rico’s autonomy as comparable to that of the
states. Here, the claim is that Puerto Rico’s transition to commonwealth status
should be considered analogous to prior territories’ admission into the Union as
states—which are bound to each other in a permanent union.30 Third, there’s an

28.

Id. at 1679 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks, brackets,
and citations omitted). The events to which Justice Sotomayor refers here occurred in 195052, which is seventy years ago.
29. Id. at 1683 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). As discussed below, see infra note 48,
Justice Sotomayor simultaneously concedes that Congress retains some power to govern
Puerto Rico under the Territory Clause.
30. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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account of representations made by U.S. delegates to the United Nations in the
immediate aftermath of the events of 1950-1952, arguing that since Puerto Rico
attained full local self-government, it should be removed from the United Nations’ Decolonization Committee’s list of non-self-governing territories—which
it was.31 Here, the claim is that these delegates’ statements, followed by the
U.N.’s removal of Puerto Rico from the list, must prove that the change that occurred in Puerto Rico’s status was not merely a change in degree, but a change
in kind.32 Fourth, there’s a reference to the Northwest Ordinance, which contained several “articles of compact . . . forever . . . unalterable, unless by common consent,” cited as “precedent” for Puerto Rico’s modern-day compact.33
Here, the claim is that if Congress could bind the United States to a compact
with the original territories, surely it can do the same with Puerto Rico.34 Fifth,
there’s the most important point of all: the argument that Congress may not
unilaterally revoke what it granted Puerto Rico in 1950-1952.35 This final point
is absolutely critical to the compact theory, for if Congress has the power to take
away what it has given, then the compact does not bind. If the compact does not
bind, then Puerto Rico is not sovereign. If Puerto Rico is not sovereign, then it
remains a nonsovereign U.S. territory, subject to the plenary power of Congress
under the Territory Clause, which is to say, a colony.36
It is uncontroversial that the events Justice Sotomayor describes occurred.
What is controversial is their interpretation. Yet her opinion presents them as if
there were no controversy. An exploration of these “unexplored” issues would
look nothing like this concurrence. In what follows, I suggest what it might have

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See G.A. Res. 748 (VIII) (Nov. 27, 1953).
Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1673 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-west of the
River Ohio, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (1789).
Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1679 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1677 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Trías Monge, the leading compact theorist and an architect of Puerto Rico’s commonwealth
status, makes all of the arguments described in this paragraph in his book, except for one: he
stops short of citing the Northwest Ordinance as precedent for the compact, and simply describes the debate among supporters of the compact over whether the borrow the language of
the Northwest Ordinance. TRÍAS MONGE, supra note 14, at 111. In an article published the following year, Trías Monge went further and oﬀered his own view that the Northwest Ordinance was precedent for Puerto Rico’s compact. José Trías Monge, Plenary Power and the Principle of Liberty: An Alternative View of the Condition of Puerto Rico, 68 REVISTA JURDÍCA DE LA
UNIVERSIDAD DE P.R. 1, 21-22, 28 (1999). For other examples of the arguments described
above in support of the compact theory, see also, for example, Casellas, supra note 17; Samuel
Issacharoﬀ, Alexandra Bursak, Russell Rennie & Alec Webley, What is Puerto Rico?, 94 IND.
L.J. 1 (2019); and McCall, supra note 16. See also infra Sections II.A-E (discussing arguments
in support of the compact theory).
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looked like, examining what Justice Sotomayor includes and identifying what
she leaves out as she makes each of the five arguments described above.37
A. The Argument Based on the Events of 1950-1952
Justice Sotomayor begins with a brief history of Puerto Rico’s relationship
with the United States from 1898 to 1952.38 We learn that the island was annexed
by the United States in 1898 and subjected to military rule for nearly two years,
until, in 1900, Congress passed the Foraker Act, an organic act establishing a
civil government on the island.39 The concurrence does not describe that government, but in a nutshell, it included a Governor and eleven-member Executive
Council, all appointed by the President of the United States with Senate confirmation, and a territorial legislature with representatives chosen by popular election.40 Over time, the concurrence continues, Congress granted Puerto Rico “incremental measures of autonomy,” such as Congress’ conferral of U.S. citizenship

37.

For arguments against the compact theory, see, for example, 1-2 GRUPO DE INVESTIGADORES
PUERTORRIQUEÑOS, BREAKTHROUGH FROM COLONIALISM: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF
STATEHOOD 1300-02 (Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 1984); TORRUELLA, supra
note 14; Christina Duﬀy Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 870-77 (2005); David M. Helfeld, Congressional
Intent and Attitude Toward Public Law 600 and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, 21 REVISTA JURÍDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE P.R. 255, 307 (1952); Carlos R. Soltero, Is
Puerto Rico a “Sovereign” for Purposes of the Dual Sovereignty Exception to the Double Jeopardy
Clause?, 28 REVISTA JURÍDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA DE PUERTO RICO 183, 19497 (1994); Juan R. Torruella, ¿Hacia Dónde Vas, Puerto Rico?, 107 YALE L.J. 1503, 1522 (1998);
and Torruella, A Reply to the Notion of “Territorial Federalism,” supra note 16.
38. Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1670-73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). Commonwealthers sometimes begin a little earlier, describing Puerto Rico’s “Autonomic Charter of
1897” as precedent for the compact. See, e.g., TRÍAS MONGE, supra note 14, at 12-16, 107. Spain
created a Charter of Autonomy for Puerto Rico (and another for Cuba) on the eve of the
United States’s intervention in the war with Spain in 1898. It supposedly could not be
amended without Puerto Rico’s consent, but the proposition was never tested because the
Charter was in place for less than a year. See generally Christina Duﬀy Ponsa [Ponsa-Kraus],
When Statehood Was Autonomy, in RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE (Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko Brown-Nagin eds., 2015) (examining “the nearly two-year period following Puerto Rico’s annexation, during which there
existed virtually unanimous support among the island’s political leaders for Puerto Rico’s admission into the United States as a state of the Union”).
39. An Act Temporarily to Provide Revenues and a Civil Government for Porto Rico, and for
Other Purposes (Foraker Act), ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
40. Id. §§ 17-32. The Executive Council served as the upper house of the legislature; the elected
body was the lower house.
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upon Puerto Ricans in the Jones Act of 1917.41 This is a questionable example of
increased “autonomy,” though, since it was followed by a Supreme Court decision holding that the grant of citizenship had changed nothing about Puerto
Rico’s status.42
This brings Justice Sotomayor to the early 1950s, the crucial moment in
which, on the pro-compact account, Congress finally and irrevocably relinquished all of its sovereignty over Puerto Rico’s internal self-government.43 In
1950, Congress passed Public Law 600, a federal statute that recognized and affirmed the principle of government by consent, described itself as a law “in the
nature of a compact,” and authorized the people of Puerto Rico to adopt their
own constitution.44 Public Law 600 was submitted to the Puerto Rican electorate, who voted in favor of it and elected delegates to a constitutional convention. The convention drafted a constitution and submitted it to Congress, which
in a second law, Public Law 447, approved it with several modifications, and with
the caveat that it would become eﬀective only after the people of Puerto Rico
themselves approved it by “formal resolution.”45 They approved it by popular
ratification.46
Compact theorists (i.e., commonwealthers) have been unclear as to when,
exactly, the mutually binding bilateral compact allegedly came into being. Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence does not make it any clearer. Was it when Congress
passed Public Law 600, which described itself as “in the nature of a compact”?
Or when the Puerto Rican electorate approved the process prescribed in Public
Law 600? Or when Congress approved their Constitution? Or when the people
of Puerto Rico ratified it?

41.

42.

43.
44.

45.

46.

Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1671 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment); see An Act to Provide
a Civil Government for Porto Rico, and for Other Purposes (Jones Act of 1917), ch. 145, § 5,
39 Stat. 951, 953.
See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304-14 (1922). On the complicated history of U.S. citizenship in Puerto Rico, see JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE:
NOTES ON THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP OF PUERTO RICANS
(1979); and ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS, supra note 8.
See, e.g., TRÍAS MONGE, supra note 14, at 107-18; Casellas, supra note 17, at 946-48.
Public Law 600, ch. 446, § 1, 64 Stat. 319, 319 (1950). Although Justice Breyer’s opinion for
the Court declines to discuss the eﬀect of Public Law 600 on the Appointments Clause issue,
see Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1665 (2020),
his opinion for the Court does explain that Public Law 600 adopted and substantially (but
not entirely) repealed the Jones Act of 1917, renaming it the Federal Relations Act.
Joint Resolution, Approving the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Which
Was Adopted by the People of Puerto Rico on March 3, 1952, Pub. L. No. 447, 66 Stat. 327,
328 (1952).
TRÍAS MONGE, supra note 14, at 115.
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Critics of the compact theory of course do not deny that these events occurred. They simply argue that none of them produced a mutually binding bilateral compact because Congress had neither the intent nor the power to do so.47
Agreeing that the events of 1950-1952 were a watershed moment in Puerto Rican
history, critics nevertheless argue that Congress merely did what Congress has
always had the power to do under the Territory Clause: it conferred upon Puerto
Rico a significant degree of autonomy—greater autonomy than any territory before it—but it did not relinquish U.S. sovereignty under the Territory Clause,
nor could it have. There is no hint of this competing interpretation in Justice
Sotomayor’s account.48
B. The Argument Based on Suggestive Quotations
Turning to the second argument, the concurrence builds the case for the
compact theory with a series of quotations, mainly from federal court opinions,
referring to the compact and describing Puerto Rico as having achieved a degree
of autonomy comparable to that of the states of the Union.49 These quotations

47.

See, e.g., Torruella, A Reply to the Notion of “Territorial Federalism,” supra note 16, at 77-89.
48. Justice Sotomayor concedes that Congress retains some power under the Territory Clause,
but states (without explanation) that such power can be reconciled with the compact. See
Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1679 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). For a long time,
commonwealthers argued that in 1952, Puerto Rico ceased to be a “territory,” based on the
(correct) understanding that territorial status and the compact theory are incompatible. See,
e.g., Casellas, supra note 17, at 948. This argument has become less common in the wake of
overwhelming evidence that the federal government still considers Puerto Rico a territory.
See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1875-77 (2016). The Court’s decision in
Sanchez Valle (from which Justice Sotomayor dissented) was a blow to compact theory insofar
as the Court assumed that Puerto Rico is a territory, and held that Puerto Rico is not a separate
sovereign for purposes of double jeopardy. While the holding was purportedly limited to the
double-jeopardy context, the parties’ briefs and the Court’s reasoning made clear that the case
had ramifications beyond that limited context. Recognizing this problem, the late pro-commonwealth Governor of Puerto Rico and leading compact theorist, Rafael Hernández Colón,
published an article on Sanchez Valle trying to salvage the compact theory. He did this by
overreading the Sanchez Valle Court’s observation that “Puerto Rico . . . [is] sovereign ‘in one
commonly understood sense of that term’” (which in context clearly meant that it has local
powers of self-government), and arguing that the case stands for the proposition that Puerto
Rico is a separate sovereign—in other words, that it stands for the opposite of what it held.
See Rafael Hernández Colón, The Evolution of Democratic Governance Under the Territorial
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 587, 600 (2017). Justice Sotomayor cites
Hernández Colón in this passage, as she breathes new life into the compact theory by attempting to reconcile it with the undeniable fact, aﬃrmed in Sanchez Valle, that Puerto Rico remains
a nonsovereign U.S. territory.
49. Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1655; see, e.g., Casellas, supra note 17, at 952-58; Issacharoﬀ et al., supra
note 36, at 11-12.
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appear over the course of a two-page passage following Justice Sotomayor’s description of the events of 1950-1952. There is little text between one quote and
the next except for citations to their sources. They create the strong impression
that there is an avalanche of support for the compact theory.
Critics of the compact theory, however, could supply plenty of quotations in
support of their point of view.50 And they would have arguments to make in
response to the quotations on Justice Sotomayor’s list, starting with the very first
one: “In 1952, ‘both Puerto Rico and the United States ratified Puerto Rico’s
Constitution.’”51 This quotation comes from the dissenting opinion in Sanchez
Valle v. Puerto Rico, which Justice Sotomayor joined.52 While she does
acknowledge it was a dissent, the objection to the quoted statement would be
that, out of context, it is misleading—in a way that has significant implications
for the compact theory. We all know what “ratified” implies: it implies a popular
act of constitution-making, as opposed to an ordinary act of legislation. Compact
theorists describe 1952 as a popular act of constitution-making, and it was—in
Puerto Rico, where the people ratified their Constitution. But the United States
did not “ratify” anything, in a constitution-making sense, in 1952. Congress approved Puerto Rico’s constitution through ordinary legislation. The United
States did not amend its own Constitution, nor did it take any measure that
could be confused with an amendment. Thus, it is incorrect to say that “Puerto
Rico and the United States ratified Puerto Rico’s Constitution.”53
But the battle of the quotes is a dead end anyway. For every statement that
Puerto Rico has “a measure of autonomy comparable to that possessed by the
States,” there is a competing statement that “Congress retains all essential powers set forth under our constitutional system, and it will be Congress and Congress alone which ultimately will determine the changes, if any, in the political
status of the island.”54 Moreover, the list of quotations provided here is problematic in yet another way: no matter how many court opinions or oﬃcial texts one
50.
51.
52.
53.

54.

Torruella, A Reply to the Notion of “Territorial Federalism,” supra note 16, at 79-84 (collecting a
number of them).
Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1672 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (quoting Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v.
Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1881 (2016)).
Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1881 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See also Weiss & Setser, supra note 15 (arguing that a commonwealth arrangement that truly
decolonized Puerto Rico “would arguably require an amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as
over a century of federal actions and judicial decisions, including two recent Supreme Court
cases, have suggested that Congress will continue to have absolute authority over Puerto Rico
under the current constitutional arrangement . . . .”). The two Supreme Court cases to which
the quotation refers to are presumably Sanchez Valle and Puerto Rico v. Franklin California TaxFree Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1673 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Examining
Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 597 (1976)); Torruella, A
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finds mentioning the compact and extolling the virtues of self-government it
purportedly represents, one will not find any actually holding that Congress’
grant of autonomy to Puerto Rico was irrevocable. The irrevocability of the compact is essential to the compact theory, which is why commonwealthers insist
that the compact is mutually binding: again, if Congress retains the power to
modify or withdraw from the compact, then Congress retains ultimate control
over Puerto Rican self-government, and Puerto Rico remains a colony.
C. The Argument Based on Representations Made to the United Nations
Justice Sotomayor next turns to statements made by U.S. representatives to
the United Nations in 1953, to the eﬀect that because Puerto Rico had achieved
local self-government the previous year, it should now be removed from the list
of non-self-governing territories.55 Frances P. Bolton and Mason Sears usually
make an appearance at this point, and here they are in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence. The concurrence identifies Bolton as the “U.S. Rep. to the General Assembly.” To be clear, however, she was an Ohio congresswoman appointed by
President Eisenhower to join the U.S. delegation to the United Nations in 1953,
not the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, whose words would arguably
have carried greater weight. Sears, meanwhile, served as the U.S. delegate to the
Committee on Information.56
As part of the U.S. eﬀort to get Puerto Rico removed from the list, both Bolton and Sears definitely made statements supportive of the compact theory. Bolton claimed that Puerto Rico and the United States had entered into “a compact
of a bilateral nature whose terms may be changed only by common consent,” and
Sears claimed that “[a] compact . . . is far stronger than a treaty [because a]
treaty can be denounced by either side, whereas a compact cannot be denounced
by either party unless it has the permission of the other.”57 Compact theorists
quote these statements as further evidence in support of the argument that Congress must have meant to enter into a binding relationship with Puerto Rico in
Reply to the Notion of “Territorial Federalism,” supra note 16, at 80 (quoting 96 CONG. REC. 9595
(1950), and describing the statement as reflective of the apparent “general consensus” on Public Law 600 during the debate on the House floor).
55. Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1675-77 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment); see, e.g., TRÍAS
MONGE, supra note 14, at 123; Casellas, supra note 17, at 948.
56. On the practice of appointing sitting members of Congress to serve on a one-time basis as
delegates to sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, see CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
IF10464, UNITED NATIONS ISSUES: CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (2020).
57. Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1677-78 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). See 29 Dept. State
Bull. 802, 804 (Dec. 7, 1953) (Bolton statement); 29 Dept. State Bull. 329, 329 (Sept. 21, 1953)
(Sears statement).
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1950-1952. As Justice Sotomayor puts it, if these representations to the United
Nations were “merely aspirational,” not only would “the United States’[s] compliance with its international obligations be in substantial doubt,” but Congress
would have made Puerto Rico an “empty promise.”58 And so, the argument goes,
the compact theory must be true.59
These arguments misunderstand the problem with Bolton’s and Sears’s
statements. The problem is not that their statements were “merely aspirational,”
but that they were incorrect. Congress did not make an “empty promise,” because
Congress did not promise Puerto Rico a mutually binding bilateral compact.60 If
anything, the word “aspirational” more accurately captures the language of Public Law 600 itself, which avoids a clear and direct reference to a compact, instead
using the bet-hedging phrase “in the nature of a compact.”
Bolton and Sears were simply mistaken when they claimed that the United
States had entered into a mutually binding bilateral compact with Puerto Rico.
The argument that their representations must be true because their falsity would
mean that the United States might be in violation of its international obligations
rests on the self-evidently flawed premise that one can avoid legal jeopardy by
the expedient of treating false propositions as true. If recognition of their falsity
places the United States in violation of its international obligations, the solution
is not to claim that their statements must be true, but to insist that the United
Nations put Puerto Rico back on the list of non-self-governing territories until
the United States actually decolonizes the island.
Moreover, whether the events of 1952 met an international standard suﬃcient to remove Puerto Rico from the list of non-self-governing territories is an
entirely separate question from whether the U.S. Constitution even permits an
irrevocable compact in the first place, let alone whether Congress oﬀered or
entered into such a compact in 1950-1952.61 The views of representatives sent to
the United Nations as part of an eﬀort to remove Puerto Rico from a list of
colonies have no bearing on the latter, purely legal question.
58.

Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1678 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
59. Probably the best-known example of the “empty promise” point is an oft-cited opinion by
First Circuit Judge Calvert Magruder, who responded to arguments against the compact theory by refusing to “impute to the Congress the perpetration of such a monumental hoax.”
Figueroa v. Puerto Rico, 232 F.2d 615, 620 (1st Cir. 1956). Torruella, A Reply to the Notion of
“Territorial Federalism,” supra note 16, at 85-89, borrows the phrase “monumental hoax” to
criticize Bolton’s and Sears’s statements, in an implicit reference to Judge Magruder’s opinion.
60. For an argument that is sympathetic to some form of intermediate status for Puerto Rico, such
as “associated statehood,” yet nevertheless questions the accuracy of these representations to
the United Nations, see Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1153-57
(2009).
61. See id. at 1152-53.
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D. The Argument Based on the Northwest Ordinance
Another familiar argument invokes the Northwest Ordinance of 1789 as
precedent establishing the power of Congress to enter into a binding compact
that it may not alter or withdraw from unilaterally.62 Sure enough, there it is in
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence.63 She relegates this argument to a footnote,
and there is a satisfying symmetry here: the Northwest Ordinance itself is in a
footnote, at page 51 of the first volume of the Statutes at Large.64 That’s right: the
Statutes at Large, a compilation of ordinary legislation passed by Congress and
requiring no more than a simple majority to enact—or repeal.
The Northwest Ordinance introduces the six articles that comprise its second
half in the following language: “That the following articles shall be considered
as articles of compact between the original States, and the people and States in
the said territory, and forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent.”65
Justice Sotomayor quotes this language in support of the proposition that “Public Law 600 was not entirely without precedent,” adding that “proponents of
Public Law 600 were vocal in their reliance on the Northwest Ordinance as a
model.”66 They were indeed, and they still are.67 But opponents of the compact
have a voice too, even if it is not represented in this concurrence. We disagree
with the argument that the Northwest Ordinance provides precedent for a compact that actually, as opposed to aspirationally, binds.68
For one thing, while the Northwest Ordinance contains language seemingly
supportive of the compact theory, that language refers to a compact with the

62.

63.
64.

65.
66.
67.
68.
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See, e.g., Trías Monge, Plenary Power, supra note 36, at 28; Hearing on H.R. 900 and H.R. 1230
Before the H. Comm. on Nat. Res. S. Comm. on Insular Aﬀairs, 110th Cong. 3-4, at 40-44 (March
22, 2007) (written testimony of Richard H. Pildes, Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional
Law, New York University School of Law).
See Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1678 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
1 Stat. 51 n(a). As the text accompanying the footnote explains, the first Congress reenacted
the Northwest Ordinance, which had originally been enacted by the Continental Congress,
with revisions “so as to adapt the same to the present Constitution of the United States.” Id.
at 50-51.
1 Stat. at 53 n.(a) (preamble to articles).
Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1678 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
See sources cited supra note 62.
Admittedly, the critics’ views on this particular argument are harder to find in writing, but
Justice Sotomayor might have mentioned former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh’s
writing on this question. See, e.g., RICHARD THORNBURGH, PUERTO RICO’S FUTURE: A TIME
TO DECIDE (2007) (describing the ways in which the treatment of twentieth century territories
broke with the pattern set by the Northwest Ordinance); Richard Thornburgh, The Northwest
Ordinance: No Precedent, SAN JUAN STAR (Oct. 11, 2001).
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“people and States in the said territory,” which strongly suggests that any promises made here are inextricably intertwined with statehood, and have nothing to
do with alternatives to statehood.69 For another, the entire nineteenth-century
history of the admission of territories into statehood confirms this impression.70
Moreover, it is not at all clear what Justice Sotomayor means by “precedent,”
and she does not elaborate.71 If she means that the Northwest Ordinance provides an earlier example of Congress’s use of the term “compact” in a statute, it
does, though what leaps out at the reader is the stark contrast between the forcefulness of the language in the Ordinance (“articles of compact . . . forever . . . unalterable”) and the timidity of the language in Public Law 600 (“in
the nature of a compact”). If she means that the Ordinance provides a precedent
with weight somehow comparable to that of a judicial decision—which is what
the term “precedent” implies—then it would require far more than bare assertion
to support the claim.
For example: On the one hand, the Ordinance does use language that is not
just forceful, but that purports to make a binding commitment. And one might
add that the First Congress, whose views on the meaning of the Constitution
arguably carry particular weight,72 enacted it. On the other hand, one cannot
reach a conclusion about what this language means without reckoning with the

69.

1 Stat. at 53 n.(a) (emphasis added).
See generally PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 2019) (1987).
71. Indeed, not only does Justice Sotomayor relegate her argument based on the Northwest Ordinance to a footnote, but she does nothing more than describe it as “precedent,” add that it
was “the only extant precedent” for Public Law 600, and cite two articles that themselves
provide rather weak support for this argument. Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1678 n.3 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). She cites one of them, Lawson & Sloane, supra note 60, for the
proposition that the term “compact” rarely appears in U.S. law except in the Northwest Ordinance and several subsequent organic statutes. But as noted above, see supra note 60, Lawson
and Sloane themselves question the argument that Puerto Rico’s compact is binding, see id. at
1131. And Lawson adds the suggestion that if the Northwest Ordinance is an example of congressional entrenchment, it could be due to the Engagements Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.1
(“All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.”), which obviously would have no bearing on Puerto Rico. Lawson & Sloane, supra
note 60, at 1153 n.163. As for the second source, TRÍAS MONGE, supra note 14, she cites it for
its discussion of the debate over whether Public Law 600 should borrow the language of the
Northwest Ordinance, rather than for an argument in support of it as precedent (though, as
noted above, Trías Monge does make the argument for the Northwest Ordinance as precedent
for the compact elsewhere, see supra note 36).
72. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401-02 (1819). Specifically, the First Congress reenacted it, with revisions intended to make it consistent with the U.S. Constitution.
See supra note 64.
70.

119

the yale law journal forum

September 21, 2020

subsequent history of congressional action with respect to the territories. Congress did keep the promise of statehood, but not without unilaterally altering—
over the full-throated protests of the aﬀected territorial inhabitants—the boundaries set forth in the fifth of those “unalterable” articles of compact.73 And that is
not even to mention the fate of the promises in the third:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians;
their land and property shall never be taken from them without their
consent; and in their property, right and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time
be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving
peace and friendship with them.74
It would be a wild understatement to say that the United States, which went
on to renege on every one of these assurances, turned out not to consider
itself bound by them.75
In short, not only is Congress’s unequivocal language in the Northwest
Ordinance unlike its noncommittal language in Public Law 600, but even
language as unequivocal as that does not establish Congress’s power to make
binding promises. Subsequent practice here swamps textual inferences.
When it comes to the question whether Congress intended and believed that
the Northwest Ordinance would create a legally irrevocable compact, Congress’s words point in one direction, but its subsequent actions point emphatically in another.
E. The Argument that One Congress Can Bind Another
The most important argument in compact theory, and therefore in Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence, directly tackles the question whether Congress has the
power to take away what it has given.76 It is at this point in her concurrence that
Justice Sotomayor comes closest to acknowledging the existence of an opposing
point of view, in the following three sentences:

73.

See ONUF, supra note 70, at 67-87.
74. 1 Stat. at 52 n.(a) (Art. III).
75. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE
FRONTIER (2005); PAUL FRYMER, BUILDING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE ERA OF TERRITORIAL
AND POLITICAL EXPANSION (2017).
76. Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1677-78 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment); see, e.g., TRÍAS
MONGE, supra note 14, at 171; McCall, supra note 16.
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Of course, it might be argued that Congress is nevertheless free to repeal
its grant of self-rule, including the grant of authority to the island to select its own governmental oﬃcers. And perhaps, it might further be said,
that is exactly what Congress has done in PROMESA by declaring the
Board “an entity within the territorial government” of Puerto Rico.
§101(c)(1), 130 Stat. 553. But that is not so certain.77
No citations have been omitted from this quotation. Justice Sotomayor
simply gestures at the counterarguments as if they were possibilities, rather than
actualities.78 She then proceeds to make the case against them, arguing that
PROMESA did not implicitly repeal the grant of self-rule, and that Congress
does not have the power to do so expressly.
On the first point, she argues that PROMESA is a “temporary” statute passed
to address an economic crisis, not an “organic statute clearly or expressly purporting to renege on Congress’ prior gran[t] . . . [of] a measure of autonomy
comparable to that possessed by the States.”79 True, PROMESA does not expressly purport to renege on a prior grant of autonomy, though why it matters
that it is temporary is unclear. According to the compact theory, Congress lacks
the power to repeal the grant of self-rule, period. If it can do so for even a minute,
then the compact is not irrevocable and compact theory fails. And for what it’s
worth, organic acts are all temporary.80
At any rate, the far more serious problem here is that PROMESA obviously
reneges on a prior grant of autonomy, even if it does not do so by saying so.
Indeed, Justice Sotomayor’s own description of the Board’s powers renders the
conclusion inescapable. The Board, she tells us, “oversee[s] the island’s finances
and restructure[s] its debts.” She continues:
The Board’s decisions have aﬀected the island’s entire population . . . . It
is under the yoke of [the Board’s] austerity measures that the island’s 3.2
million citizens now chafe . . . . Despite the Board’s wide-ranging, veto-

77.

Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1677 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
For these counterarguments, see sources cited supra note 37. See also Lawson & Sloane, supra
note 60, at 1131 (“[T]he weight of authority suggests that neither Congress nor the executive
branch understood Public Law 600 as an irrevocable delegation of Congress’s otherwise plenary authority under the Territories Clause, even assuming that such a statute would be constitutional.”); id. at 1153-57.
79. Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1677 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
80. A territory’s organic act is displaced by a state constitution upon the territory’s admission into
statehood; many nineteenth-century organic acts expressly described the governments they
created as “temporary.” See Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 37, at 825 n.127 (quoting titles
of nineteenth-century organic acts).
78.
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free authority over Puerto Rico, the solitary role PROMESA contemplates for Puerto Rican-selected oﬃcials is this: The Governor of Puerto
Rico sits as an ex oﬃcio Board member without any voting rights. No
individual within Puerto Rico’s government plays any part in determining which seven members now decide matters critical to the island’s
fate.81
How is this not a blatant repeal of the grant of self-rule? Making the case for
the compact several pages later, Justice Sotomayor remarks that “[i]t would seem
curious to interpret PROMESA as having [reneged on Congress’ prior grant of
autonomy] indirectly, simply through its characterization of the Board ‘as an entity within the territorial government.’”82 Surely it would be, but no one argues
that it is “simply” those words that had this eﬀect. It is, rather, the brutal reality
of the Board’s “wide-ranging, veto-free authority,” as Justice Sotomayor herself
describes it, that implicitly, because necessarily, repealed the grant of self-rule.
There is still the matter of whether Congress could expressly repeal the grant
of self-rule, if one persists in denying that Congress already did so through
PROMESA. Acknowledging the “truism” that “one Congress cannot bind a later
Congress,”83 Justice Sotomayor points out that there are exceptions to that rule,
citing as examples Congress’ grant of independence to the Philippines and its

81.

Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1674 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). It should be noted
that the Board arguably has somewhat narrower powers than this passage in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence suggests. See Vázquez Garced v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.,
945 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2019) (“There are certainly policies and actions that can be adopted and
pursued only with the Governor’s approval. And even with respect to matters on which the
Board needs no consent . . . PROMESA favors collaboration when possible.”). That said, my
focus here is on the inconsistency between Justice Sotomayor’s description of the Board’s powers and her claim that an irrevocable compact exists, though the tension would persist even
on a narrower understanding of the Board’s powers, insofar as the Board would still constitute
a substantial and unilateral modification of Puerto Rico’s self-government. See also id. at 6-7
(holding that even after the Governor rejects a recommendation by the Board, the Board has
the power to implement it unilaterally). I am grateful to Patricio Martínez Llompart for drawing my attention to this case.
82. Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1677 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
83. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S.
260, 274 (2012)).
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grants of land or other vested interests.84 She does not elaborate on either example, nor does she suggest that anyone might disagree. But one might.85 Philippine independence “binds” Congress because the Philippines is a sovereign and
independent nation-state, which the United States would have to (re)conquer in
order for the grant of independence to be undone. And although it has not always been the case, these days international law prohibits conquest.86 As for land
grants and other vested interests, the mere mention of them begs the question
whether Puerto Rico has an analogous property interest in the “compact.”87
Justice Sotomayor does go on to say that “[p]lausible reasons may exist to
treat Public Law 600 and the Federal Government’s recognition of Puerto Rico’s
sovereignty as similarly irrevocable, at least in the absence of mutual consent.”88
But the reasons she oﬀers once again turn out to consist entirely of suggestive
quotations, led by Public Law 600, which, yes, we know, describes itself as “in
the nature of a compact.”89
These quotations are not nothing. But equally plausible reasons exist not to
interpret the grant of self-rule as irrevocable, and instead, to recognize it as what
it is: the current arrangement between the United States and Puerto Rico, which
Congress can unilaterally modify by exercising its power under the Territory
Clause—say, by creating a federal board to oversee and manage Puerto Rico’s
government, appointing its members however Congress sees fit, calling it an entity within the territorial government despite the fact that Congress neither
needed nor sought Puerto Rico’s consent for its creation, empowering it to supervise the territorial government and override its decisions, and forcing Puerto
Rico to pay for it.
This, of course, is PROMESA: a federal statute that unceremoniously foisted
a Board of overseers atop the government created by the Constitution of Puerto
Rico, entirely disregarding the vaunted so-called mutually binding bilateral
84.

85.

86.

87.
88.
89.

Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment); see, e.g., sources cited supra note 76; see also
Issacharoﬀ et al., supra note 36, at 14 (observing the “tension” between binding territorial
decisions of Congress and the “old truism that one Congress cannot bind another”).
See, e.g., John R. Hein, Born in the U.S.A., but Not Natural Born: How Congressional Territorial
Policy Bars Native-Born Puerto Ricans from the Presidency, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 451-52 &
nn.196-97 (2009); Lawson & Sloane, supra note 60, at 1153 n.163.
See Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625
(Oct. 24, 1970). On how it used to be, see, for example, ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 100-14 (2005); and MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18701960, at 98-178 (2009).
See also infra note 91.
Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1678 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Act of July 3, 1950, ch. 446, Pub. L. No. 600, 64 Stat. 319 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 731 (2018));
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compact. No amount of compact theorizing can change that fact, nor will ignoring those of us willing to come out and say it. Far from being unalterable except
by mutual consent, the so-called compact is, as critics have argued since the beginning, unilaterally alterable by congressional fiat.90
The compact theorists’ script runs out here.91 It is here that Justice Sotomayor concludes—almost—that PROMESA is invalid.92 Of course, as a claim
about the validity of a federal statute, “invalid” can only mean “unconstitutional.” There is no other sense in which a federal statute can be invalid. Moreover, that PROMESA is unconstitutional seems to be what she has in mind: “May
Congress,” she asks, “ever simply cede its power under [the Territory Clause] to
legislate for the Territories, and did it do so nearly 60 [sic] years ago with respect
to Puerto Rico? If so, is PROMESA itself invalid, at least as it holds itself out as
an exercise of Territories Clause authority?”93 If Congress lacked the authority
to enact PROMESA under the Territory Clause, and there is no other source for
that authority, then PROMESA is unconstitutional. Yet despite the logic of her
argument, Justice Sotomayor tells us she has no choice but to settle for suggesting that it is “invalid,” since, as she noted at the outset, the compact issue has not
been litigated. Instead of dissenting, she must “reluctantly” concur.94
Despite her asserted reluctance, though, her decision to concur instead of
dissent gives even greater force to what is already a ringing endorsement of compact theory. That is because suggestive quotations emanating from authoritative

90.

91.

92.
93.
94.
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See also, e.g., Lawson & Sloane, supra note 60, at 1153-54 (“As a textual matter, except by major
and questionable inferences from the ambiguous phrase ‘in the nature of a compact,’ it is at
best strained to read the law as purporting to lock into place in perpetuity a relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States, which may not be modified without the former’s
mandatory consent.” (footnote omitted)).
To be fair, Justice Sotomayor devotes a couple of sentences to an argument based on the words
“dispose of” in the Territory Clause, to which compact theorists themselves do not devote
much attention. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . .”); Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1679 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
the judgment); see also Casellas, supra note 17, at 960. The first sentence asserts that the power
to “dispose of” territories “necessarily encompasses the power to relinquish authority to legislate for them.” No one denies this, but it should go without saying that the fact that Congress
has the power to relinquish its authority tells one nothing about whether it has the power to
do so by entering into a mutually binding bilateral compact. The second sentence quotes a
source that in turn refers to other sources “strongly argu[ing]” that when Puerto Rico became
a commonwealth, “Congress lost general power to regulate the internal aﬀairs of Puerto Rico.”
Again, no one denies this: the question is whether Congress retained the power to resume
regulating those internal aﬀairs.
Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1679 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1683 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).

political wine in a judicial bottle

federal sources play an outsized role in the drama that is Puerto Rico’s status
debate. This is not surprising, insofar as it is a debate over how to decolonize a
marginalized people. Deprived of a voice in the government that holds the key
to their fate, Puerto Ricans borrow the voices of oﬃcials within that government,
be it this federal judge or that congressional report or some other remark by the
latest Grand Poohbah of the United States of We Know What’s Best for Puerto
Rico. Puerto Ricans battle each other over their island’s future by hurling these
quotations at each other, and at anyone who will listen, in the desperate hope of
compensating for their own lack of an equal voice and recruiting allies to their
respective causes. Given all of this, the fact that Justice Sotomayor’s views on the
compact theory appear in a concurrence rather than a dissent means that she has
given the commonwealthers the most precious gem of them all: not just one or
two suggestive quotations, but a paean to the compact theory, in nothing less
than an opinion by a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, which
will now and forever span several pages of the United States Reports, and which
they can quote without having to cite a dissent. Not an opinion for the Court,
true, but the next best thing.
iii. the compact: imperialism redux
To put forward the view of only one side in a debate as if it were a settled and
uncontested truth is bad enough; to do so in a concurring Supreme Court opinion is even worse. But the problems with this concurrence do not end there. By
invoking the compact theory, Justice Sotomayor has exacerbated the already profound and oppressive legal ambiguity that has trapped Puerto Rico in a colonial
status for a century and a quarter.95 She has done so by (perhaps inadvertently)
breathing new life into the Insular Cases—by far the most notoriously oﬀensive
and contentious Supreme Court opinions addressing Puerto Rico’s constitutional status. And she has done so despite the Aurelius Court’s eﬀort to render
these cases irrelevant.96
You may have heard of the Insular Cases, a series of Supreme Court decisions
handed down between 1901 and 1922 concerning the status of the territories annexed by the United States in 1898: Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam.97

95.

See ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS, supra note 8, at 6-7; Erman, Essential Legal Ambiguity, supra
note 8 (manuscript at 28-29).
96. Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1665 (“[W]e need not consider the request by some of the parties that
we overrule the much-criticized ‘Insular Cases’ and their progeny.”).
97. The issue of exactly which cases belong in the series has been the subject of some dispute, but
everyone agrees that the series begins with nine decisions handed down in 1901, and that the
most important one was Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). See generally EFRÉN RIVERA

125

the yale law journal forum

September 21, 2020

If you’re like most people, you know the Insular Cases are bad news, but you are
not quite sure why. You think it has something to do with the idea that the Constitution does not “follow the flag” to Puerto Rico, but you are pretty sure that
cannot really be right. And it is not. But it is not exactly wrong, either.
Like pretty much everything else aﬀecting Puerto Rico’s status, what exactly
the Insular Cases held has been the subject of much debate.98 But for present purposes, suﬃce it to say that, according to the standard account, they held that the
Constitution did not apply in the territories annexed by the United States in
1898—the “unincorporated” territories—except for its “fundamental” provisions.99 The Insular Cases left the question of which provisions did apply to these
territories to case-by-case determination, giving rise to enormous confusion and
uncertainty about both the applicability of the Constitution there and their future status: would these territories ever be admitted into statehood? Would they
become independent? Could they be held indefinitely as colonies? Although,
over time, the Court held that nearly all the provisions that came before it applied
in those territories, the confusion and uncertainty generated by the Insular Cases
persists to this day.
It might seem obvious that the Appointments Clause “applies” in Puerto
Rico—or, rather, that it does not really apply in any geographic location as such,
but instead applies to the appointment of oﬃcers of the United States, no matter
where on the planet they may end up. But because the Insular Cases created for
Puerto Rico and other unincorporated territories a constitutional status defined
by ambiguity, Puerto Ricans are never quite sure if any given constitutional provision “applies” there.
RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO 73-142 (2001); KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION
FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 72-91 (2009); BARTHOLOMEW SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006)
[hereinafter SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES]; TORRUELLA, supra note 14, at 40-84; TRÍAS
MONGE, supra note 14, at 44-50; Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 37; Adriel I. Cepeda
Derieux, A Most Insular Minority: Reconsidering Judicial Deference to Unequal Treatment in Light
of Puerto Rico’s Political Process Failure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 797, 803-10 (2010).
98. See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 72-94 (1996); Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 37, at 800-03; Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading of the Insular Cases, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 101, 155-63 (2011). One round in this longstanding debate is currently playing out in
litigation over whether the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies in the
U.S. territory of American Samoa. See Fitisemanu v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (D.
Utah 2019), appeal docketed, No. 20-4017 (10th Cir. Feb. 7, 2020). On the history of U.S. citizenship in Puerto Rico, see CABRANES, supra note 42; and ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS, supra
note 8.
99. For discussions of the standard account and challenges to it, see supra note 98. On the label
“unincorporated,” see supra notes 8-9.
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That is why the Insular Cases came up in the Aurelius litigation. If you read
the briefs in Aurelius, you know that at least one of the parties, the Unión de
Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica y Riego (UTIER), and several amici urged
the Court to overrule the Insular Cases out of concern that those decisions would
somehow render the Appointments Clause inapplicable in Puerto Rico.100 If you
heard the oral arguments, you know that the Court allocated ten minutes to
UTIER’s lawyer, during which she described the Insular Cases as a “dark cloud
hovering over this case” and implored the Court to overrule them.101 Justice
Breyer’s reaction at argument was sympathetic but puzzled. “I agree they’re a
dark cloud,” he remarked, but “it doesn’t matter here because the provision of
the Constitution does apply.”102 Chief Justice Roberts echoed the sentiment.

100.

See Brief for Appellant Union de Trabajadores de la Industria Electrica y Riego (UTIER) at
15-16, 56-66, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649
(2020) (No. 18-1334) (arguing that the opposing parties were relying on the Insular Cases
“without admitting it,” and urging the Court to overrule them). Actually, the FOMB did admit
its reliance on the Insular Cases before the District Court. See The Financial Oversight and
Management Board’s Opp’n to the Mot. to Dismiss the Title III Petition at 23-27, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020) (No. 18-1334) (arguing in the alternative that the Appointments Clause is not “fundamental,” and citing the Insular Cases). But by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the FOMB had dropped this
argument. Sharing UTIER’s concern that the Supreme Court would take it up anyway, several
amicus briefs argued that the Supreme Court should either narrow the scope of, decline to
extend, or outright overrule the Insular Cases. See Brief of Former Federal and Local Judges as
Amici Curiae Supporting the First Circuit’s Ruling on the Appointments Clause, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020) (No. 18-1334); Brief
of Amicus Curiae Virgin Islands Bar Association Supporting the Ruling on the Appointments
Clause, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020)
(No. 18-1334); Brief for Amicus Curiae Equally American Legal Defense and Education Fund
In Support of Neither Party, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140
S. Ct. 1649 (2020) (No. 18-1334); Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union
and the ACLU of Puerto Rico, Supporting the First Circuit’s Ruling on the Appointments
Clause Issue, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649
(2020) (No. 18-1334). Another amicus brief stopped short of calling on the Court to overrule
the Insular Cases, but criticized them. See Brief of Elected Oﬃcers of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico as Amici Curiae Supporting the Appointments Clause Ruling, Fin. Oversight &
Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020) (No. 18-1334). Another
(which I co-authored) argued that the Insular Cases did not govern the issue in Aurelius, and
in the alternative, that they should be overruled. See Brief for Amici Curiae Scholars of Constitutional Law and Legal History Supporting the First Circuit’s Ruling on the Appointments
Clause Issue, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649
(2020) (No. 18-1334).
101. Transcript of Oral Argument at 82, 86-87, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius
Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020) (No. 18-1334).
102. Id. at 82.
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“None of the other parties rely on the Insular Cases in any way,” he observed. “So
it would be very unusual for us to address them in this case, wouldn’t it?”103
If you then read the opinion for the Court in Aurelius, you know that the dark
cloud should have passed, at least for the time being. Justice Breyer begins with
the unequivocal statement that “the Appointments Clause governs the appointments of all oﬃcers of the United States, including those located in Puerto Rico.”
In case that is not enough, he later expressly rejects UTIER’s request that the
Court overrule the Insular Cases, not by aﬃrming them, but by declaring them
irrelevant. “Those cases,” he explains, “did not reach this issue, and whatever
their continued validity we will not extend them in this case.”104 Done and done.
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence never mentions the Insular Cases, which
would seem to indicate that she is on board with the Court’s stance on them. But
by bringing up the compact theory, she does call into doubt the Court’s conclusion after all—just not the one she claims she does. What she calls into doubt is
the Court’s conclusion that the Insular Cases are irrelevant.
Here’s how: compact theorists have put the Insular Cases to use by way of an
argument for their “reappropriation.”105 The idea is that since the Insular Cases
held most of the Constitution inapplicable in Puerto Rico, the Constitution
should impose no constraints upon Congress when it comes to devising new
forms of self-government there. This means that if Congress wishes to enter into
a mutually binding bilateral compact with Puerto Rico, the Constitution will not
stand in the way.
It is a clever argument, which attempts to repurpose the legal ambiguity
those decisions made the defining feature of Puerto Rico’s constitutional status,
turning it away from the imperialist ends it originally served, and toward the
103.

Id. at 86. As to whether the other parties were relying on the Insular Cases or not, the FOMB
did so in the alternative before the District Court, and UTIER accused them of doing so tacitly
throughout the litigation. See supra note 100.
104. Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1665. It is worth mentioning that Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court
oﬀers a pellucid account of what is known as Congress’ “plenary power” over U.S. territories
(though he does not use that phrase). Eschewing the common but mistaken understanding
that, somehow, “plenary power” means most of the Constitution does not “apply,” Justice
Breyer explains that Congress’s plenary power allows it to legislate for the territories both as
the federal government and as the territorial government, but does not exempt it from the
constitutional limitations that would ordinarily constrain the relevant exercise of power. The
point is clear from the very first paragraph, which states unequivocally that the Appointments
Clause applies to the appointment of all federal oﬃcers, including those appointed to serve in
Puerto Rico, even as the Territory Clause empowers Congress to create local oﬃces for Puerto
Rico. See id. at 1654.
105. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Constitutionalism and Individual Rights in the Territories, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 16, at 197; Alexander T. Aleinikoﬀ, Puerto Rico and the
Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 15, 37-38 (1994); Issacharoﬀ et
al., supra note 36, at 13, 34-49.
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end of self-determination—at least as the compact theorists conceive of that end.
But you will not be surprised to learn that not everyone agrees with this revisionist interpretation of the Insular Cases. To the arguments already outlined
above, critics of the compact theory would add an understanding of the Insular
Cases according to which, whatever else they did, they certainly did not empower
Congress to enter into mutually binding bilateral compacts with nonstate territories.106 To say otherwise not only exacerbates the confusion and uncertainty
that has haunted Puerto Rico since the Insular Cases, but prolongs the island’s
colonial condition, by revitalizing the jurisprudence that subjected Puerto Rico
to a subordinate status in the first place.
None of this is explicit in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence. Again, it is unclear whether she is unaware of it, or whether she is aware, but disagrees. But
once one understands the relationship between the Insular Cases and the compact
theory, one realizes that it is now the Justice’s concurrence that hangs like a dark
cloud over this case, and over Puerto Rican decolonization itself.
conclusion
This Essay has focused on the constitutional debate over the compact theory:
the debate over whether it is constitutionally possible for Puerto Rico and the
United States to enter into a mutually binding bilateral compact, which Congress
may not unilaterally alter or repeal. I have shown that Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence makes the argument in favor of the “compact theory,” without acknowledging, let alone engaging, the opposing point of view. I have given voice to that
opposition, by identifying and briefly describing the arguments we would make
(and have long made) in response. I do not purport to oﬀer a comprehensive
account of the views on both sides, but rather to correct the misimpression, created by Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, that the compact theory is a settled fact,
as opposed to just one side in a bitter, longstanding, and high-stakes debate.
Justice Sotomayor writes as if she is not only making a constitutional argument, but also defending Puerto Rican dignity and empowerment. Doubtless,
that is what she believes she is doing. But we critics of the compact theory would
also disagree with that characterization of her concurrence. As noted at the outset, we critics—most of us statehooders—do not just believe that the compact
theory is wrong as a legal matter. We also believe it is harmful as a matter of
political aspiration. To hear Justice Sotomayor tell it, the compact fulfilled the
goal of self-determination for Puerto Rico by transforming the island from the

106.

See, e.g., Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 37, at 797-98 (arguing that the Insular Cases did
the opposite of making possible an irrevocable compact, because what they actually established was Congress’ power to de-annex territory); Torruella, supra note 16, at 78.
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degraded status of a nonsovereign colony of the United States to the exalted status of a separate sovereign in a binding relationship with the United States. Or
as commonwealthers often put it, the compact permanently secured for Puerto
Rico the “best of both worlds,” where those “worlds” are statehood and independence.
Statehooders do not merely disagree with this characterization of the compact. We recoil from it.107 Were the compact not a fiction but a reality, it would
mean that Puerto Rico willingly bound itself to the United States in a permanent
union under which federal law continues to apply in Puerto Rico with few exceptions, yet Puerto Ricans remain completely denied voting representation in
the federal government. Yes, completely: both before and after 1952, the U.S.
citizens of Puerto Rico have not had the right to vote in U.S. presidential elections, or to elect U.S. Senators, or to elect voting Representatives in the U.S.
House, where the island’s only representation consists of one single nonvoting
“Resident Commissioner.”108
Statehooders believe that to be denied an equal voice in making the law that
governs you is to be a colony. We believe it is wrong for the United States to have
subjected Puerto Rico to this subordinate status indefinitely. We also believe it
is wrong for our fellow Puerto Ricans to have perpetuated the island’s colonization by continuing to vote for a “compact” that creates the illusion of political
equality while prolonging the reality of second-class citizenship. We believe that
the right to self-determination does not include a right to self-subordination.
And we believe that as long as Puerto Rico remains neither an independent nation nor a state of the Union, it is a U.S. territory, which is to say, a U.S. colony.
Whatever label you attach to Puerto Rico’s current relationship with the United
States, the island belongs back on that list of non-self-governing territories until
it is no longer a colony. Puerto Rico was a colony in 1898. And in 1917. And in
1952. And in 1953. It was a colony when Congress enacted PROMESA in 2016.
And it is a colony today.
George Welwood Murray Professor of Legal History, Columbia Law School. I’m grateful to José A. Cabranes, Adriel Cepeda Derieux, Edda P. Duﬀy, Lawrence Duﬀy, Sam

107.

We do realize that a vote for commonwealth status in 1952 was a vote for the only way Congress was willing to allow Puerto Rico to achieve full local self-government under its own
constitution at that time. What I say in this passage applies with greater force to continued
support for the “compact” in the decades that followed.
108. See sources cited supra note 18; see also Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir. 2010)
(explaining that because Puerto Rico is not a state, residents of Puerto Rico do not have the
right to vote for congressional representatives); id. at 595 (same with respect to presidential
elections); 48 U.S.C § 891 (2018) (providing for the election of the Resident Commissioner).
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Erman, Jody Kraus, Jack Lerner, Patricio Martínez Llompart, and Nicole Duﬀy Robertson for their valuable feedback, and to Daimiris García and Chris Santana for their
excellent research assistance.
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